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Abstract 
Patents were originally designed to encourage technological innovation, which would not 
otherwise occur, and which create spillover benefits. Careful design is needed to ensure patents 
do not provide windfall benefits to inventions which would take place absent patents. Further, 
for the grant of a patent to be economically rational the patented invention must have a 
reasonable probability of providing spillover (dynamic growth) benefits that exceed monopoly 
(static inefficiency) losses. This paper draws on the substantial empirical research on industrial 
innovation and how patent systems work in practice to develop a first-best set of policy 
parameters for a balanced (parsimonious) patent system. That is, it attempts to design a set of 
parameters which maximise dynamic growth benefits while minimising static efficiency losses, 
thus complying with TRIPS Article 7. These parameters are compared with TRIPS and with the 
TRIPS-Plus elements which the USA is seeking from bi-lateral and regional trade treaties. The 
resulting schema allows a clearer view of the cost of patent policy provisions in "trade" treaties.  
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Trade treaties and patent policy: searching for a balanced approach 
1. Introduction 
Patent policy is economic policy. But most policy change comes either through trade negotiations or from 
judicial decisions, imported without any economic assessment into statute law. This does not augur well for 
soundly based policy. The key tenets for robust policy designed in the national interest are solid objective 
evidence and open and transparent evaluation processes. Neither of these conditions characterise patent 
policy changes, particularly since these have been drawn within the purview of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). 
Through a series of bilateral preferential trade agreements, mostly with close allies and small economies,1 
the USA is pursuing an aggressive “intellectual property” agenda exchanging improved market access for 
TRIPS-Plus monopoly protections. More recently the European Union (EU) joined with the USA to promote 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). This plurilateral agreement is unlikely to proceed, as the 
European Parliament overwhelmingly voted against ratification.2 In addition to substantive concerns about 
the lack of balance in the ACTA proposals, the negotiations were carried out in considerable secrecy. This 
secrecy is continued in the current Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) negotiations. Despite this, 
leaked drafts of the proposed IP chapter show that the US continues to push a TRIPS-Plus agenda, strongly 
favouring rights-holders and going far beyond current US law and practice (Flynn et al. 2012).   
Much of the response to these negotiations has been reactive, with a range of civil society organisations 
actively analysing the proposals and commenting on the problems they raise. There have also been a small 
number of more proactive proposals addressing the issue of what an appropriate reform agenda would be 
if developed from the viewpoint of maximising public welfare. The Washington Declaration of 2011 places 
intellectual property rights firmly in the context of serving societal goals. Though brief, it focuses on a 
positive agenda and, in respect of patents states:  
“In a period of rapid technological change, the patent system has serious problems. In some 
industries, very low patenting standards and a proliferation of patents of questionable validity have 
fueled a culture of competition by intimidation and litigation, rather than innovation. Even when 
patentability requirements are applied strictly, the international patent system has become too rigid 
and too unitary to accommodate the diverse needs of a complex world. A more effective and 
manageable system for fostering technological and scientific innovation should be built around a 
more diverse structure of incentives for innovation.”3  
The Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest then called for alternative incentives to 
induce needed inventions; limiting patent grants that are not justified by net benefits to the public; 
ensuring that inventions that are publicly funded are available for public use, ensuring meaningful research 
exemptions and promoting transparency in ownership and licensing.  
The Max Planck Institute has also encouraged the bringing together of relevant experts to develop a more 
proactive approach to resisting TRIPS-Plus agendas (Ruse-Khan 2014). The specific recommendations are, 
however, phrased very broadly, and rely heavily of countries involved in trade negotiations to develop all 
the detail of a more pro-active agenda. Effectively it amounts to a simple exhortation for countries to 
develop more balanced patent policies.  
This paper draws on the substantial research on industry economics that throws light on the role that 
patents do – and do not – play in creating incentives for invention and innovation. There is a massive 
                                                           
1
 Jordan 2000; Singapore 2003; Australia 2004; Bahrain 2004; Chile 2004; Morocco 2004; Colombia 2006; Oman 2006; Panama 
2007; Peru 2007; and Korea 2007. These eleven countries account for only 8.5 percent of US trade, mostly accounted for by the 
three high-income countries Australia, Korea and Singapore (Flynn et al. 2012: 109-110).  
2
 There were 478 votes against ratification, 39 for and 165 abstentions (see Monica Horten, “Wow what a scorcher! ACTA 
slaughtered 478 to 39”, IPtegrity.com, 4 July 2012 (http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php/acta/781-wow-what-a-scorcher-acta-
slaughtered-478-to-39).  
3
 Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, August 25-27, 2011, The Washington Declaration on Intellectual 
Property and the Public Interest, http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Washington-Declaration-Print.pdf pp3-4. 
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internal contradiction in the patent system. The mechanism used as an incentive for more invention 
operates by suppressing the dissemination of new technology. This tension points to a fundamental 
principle – patent privileges should only be granted to induce inventions that would not otherwise occur 
and only for those that provide spillover benefits greater than their static efficiency loss. If neither the 
inducement effect nor the net welfare benefit effect is present, then there is no rational basis for grant of a 
patent. In essence an effective patent system is a parsimonious patent system. 
A parsimonious patent system – one that ensures that dynamic efficiency gains exceed static efficiency 
losses and minimises windfall gains – would suit any country at any level of development. Indeed it would 
suit any nation better than the TRIPS system, and very much better than TRIPS-Plus proposals. The design 
presented here covers: patent policy objectives; patentable subject matter; the inventive step; the 
privileges provided by patents; incentives, penalties and strategic gaming; and transparency issues 
particularly oversight, evaluation and audit. These are put forward as policy principles. Once developed and 
agreed they can be translated into appropriate treaty language.  
2. Key elements of a balanced patent policy design 
2.1 Patent policy objectives 
The traditional economic argument for the patent intervention is spelled out as a problem of fast copying. 
Many economists argue that industrial innovators have insufficient exclusive time in the market to recoup 
their development costs if competition is unrestrained. Patents are designed to overcome this alleged 
problem.  
But fast copying alone is not sufficient to justify the patent 
intervention. It is because industrial innovation is widely considered 
to have higher social returns than private returns (ie has 
uncapturable spillover benefits) that the intervention becomes 
rational. It is generally presumed that these dynamic benefits exceed 
the losses from reduced competition, so that society benefits, though 
perhaps with a time lag. This societal goal of patent policy was 
emphasised in the recent Indian Supreme Court decision – the 
purpose of a patent system is to benefit the nation not to reward 
individual inventors.4 Private returns are not the issue here. Where 
private returns to innovation are high, patents are not needed to 
induce the innovation. Only where private returns are low are 
patents needed, but they are efficient only if spillover benefits are 
high enough to offset the associated static efficiency losses. This 
indicates an important requirement that should be included as a key 
policy objective. 
Surprisingly, the economic objectives of patent policy are rarely mentioned in national patent legislation. 
They are clearly spelled out in the TRIPS Agreement:  
"The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion 
of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."  (TRIPS, Article 7) 
Article 7 thus provides a clear articulation of the principle goal of patent policy – to encourage 
technological innovation in a way that promotes social and economic welfare.  
Patent policy was initially designed by mercantilist nations to gain a competitive edge in domestic 
technology development. Their early (C19th) extension to international players is, in some ways, perverse. 
                                                           
4 "Patent systems are not created in the interest of the inventor but in the interest of national economy. The rules and regulations 
of the patent systems are not governed by civil or common law but by political economy." Cited in Novartis AG v Union of India and 
others, Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716 of 2013, Supreme Court of India at 36. 
The real objective of patent 
policy is to encourage 
domestic technological 
innovation that would not 
otherwise take place and 
whose spillover benefits are 
greater than the cost of the 
restraint on competition. 
 
3 
It is only through uncapturable spillovers in the domestic economy that a country benefits from granting 
patent monopolies. Without such spillovers to other innovating firms there are no dynamic efficiency gains 
against which to offset the static efficiency losses from reduced competition. It is not, therefore, rational to 
provide patent privileges for imported products unless these deliver substantial net consumer surplus. Until 
TRIPS, this key fact was recognised in the local working requirement.  
But a preference for domestically produced goods is anathema in a free trade context. TRIPS Article 27.1 
requires that patents shall be granted “without discrimination as to … whether products are imported or 
locally produced.” There are differing interpretations on whether TRIPS actually bans local working 
provisions.5 Banning the local working requirement raises significant challenges as to the underlying 
rationale for a patent system as it substantially undermines the quantum of dynamic efficiency benefits in 
the patent-granting nation.  
Where a nation grants patents to goods which are imported it loses a very large part of the potential 
dynamic benefits that patents are meant to create. Yet it retains all the costs of reduced competition. For 
many nations, the majority of patents granted are granted to overseas entities.6 In such nations it is 
particularly important that there are very high standards for patent grant in order to minimise the losses 
due to granting monopoly rights to overseas entities. The next two sections of this paper discuss two 
important ways in which a country can achieve high standards for patent grant – limiting patents to 
technological inventions and requiring a high standard of inventiveness. Such changes would substantially 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the patent system. 
2.2 Limitation to technological innovations 
Patents were historically limited to technological inventions, though patent statutes rarely specify this. 
Germany, which undertook substantial research before designing its patent laws, has a fundamental, but 
unwritten, limitation to technology.7 Bakels notes that the limitation to technical inventions was always 
considered a rule of customary law (Bakels 2012: 42). This viewpoint is clearly stated in a 1976 decision by 
the German Federal Court of Justice: 
"The patent system is also not conceived as a reception basin, in which all otherwise not legally 
privileged mental achievements should find protection. It was on the contrary conceived as a special 
law for the protection of a delimited sphere of mental achievements, namely the technical ones, and 
it has always been understood and applied in this way." 8 
TRIPS Article 7 emphasises this fundamental and critical aspect of patent policy – the patent system is 
designed only for technological innovations. The reasons for this centre on the experimentation (and hence 
cost) required to develop new technological artefacts. It is these lumpy costs which underlie the view that 
time in the market can be too short to ensure an adequate return to the R&D investment. In contrast, in 
other parts of an economy, such as business methods, the R&D phase can frequently be limited to the idea 
itself. Implementation usually incurs only production costs not R&D costs, so the argument that early 
competitors will undermine returns to R&D does not withstand scrutiny. Given that it always takes 
competitors some time to deliver their version of the product to the market,9 where R&D costs are low or 
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 The one WTO dispute on this issue was settled politically (Attaran and Champ 2002). Mercurio and Tyagi (2010) consider that local 
working may be allowed under TRIPS and provide a technical legal analysis of the issue. Local working was apparently one of the 
most contentious issues in the TRIPS negotiations and the controversy remains alive today (Thadikkaran 2013).  
6
 For example in Australia the proportion of patents granted to overseas entities has remained stable at 92 per cent for decades. 
Over the period 1998 to 2012 the percentage granted to non-resident entities varied from 92 to 99 in Singapore, from 87 to 99 for 
Malaysia, from 93 to 99 for Vietnam, from 86 to 91 for Canada and from 85 to 93 for New Zealand (calculated from data at 
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/). The USA and UK are middle ranking in the dominance of foreign 
entities among patent holders (comparable US figures are 46 to 52 and for the UK 44 to 54). At the other end of the scale countries 
such as France (8 to 20), Germany (12 to 16) and Japan (9 to 18) have very low proportions of patents granted to foreign entities.  
7
 Assumptions that are fundamental to agreed views on how society does and should work are so generally shared that they are 
rarely mentioned (Hirschman 1977: 69).  
8
 Pilch provides this translation from the Court's 1976 Disposition Program decision (Pilch 2003: 293).  
9
 The original empirical research demonstrating the costs and time required for copying was undertaken by Mansfield and 
colleagues (Mansfield et al. 1981). Their results were replicated in the larger Yale survey (Levin et al. 1987).  
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there are network effects, first-mover advantages can be considerable and will usually be sufficient to 
induce the innovation without the need for a patent monopoly.  
Empirical and theoretical analyses show that those inventions which 
may not occur absent patents are those where the initial period of 
market exclusivity is too short to recoup research and development 
(R&D) costs.10 This will typically be discrete product inventions which 
are highly codified and which can therefore be imitated more quickly. 
The most obvious policy conclusion from this range of empirical 
evidence is that innovations should be patentable only in selected 
technologies/industries.11 
Courts and patent offices have laboured over definitions of “technological” and “technical”, with poor 
results. What the patent system needs is good proxies to identify inventions where substantial 
experimentation is required. If "technological" and "technical" are understood as proxies for this, we could 
achieve far more satisfactory boundaries to the patent system. This could be done by including in 
Explanatory Memoranda clear references to the intent to provide patents only where time in the market 
would not permit recoupment of R&D costs. Another approach to delimiting the scope of patentable 
(technological) inventions is the traditional exceptions – inventions that do not meet either the original 
“manner of manufacture” or “industrial applicability” tests. As courts (and quasi-courts such at the EPO 
Technical Boards) have substantially diluted these two tests over time,12 the broad exceptions to what 
constitutes a technological invention need to be spelled out in patent statutes. However in the interests of 
remaining flexible for unknown future technologies it is preferable that the boundaries to what is a 
patentable (technological) invention are spelled out in terms of the kinds of things excluded.  
Patentable inventions should not include: 
• Inventions where R&D costs are low or exclusive time in the market without patents is long; 
• Discoveries – things that are not markedly different from things found in nature; 
• Mathematical algorithms – there is argument as to whether mathematics is a science or an art, but 
it is certainly not a technology. It is a critical enabling discipline in many genuine technological areas. 
Software was never intended by any parliament or government to be patentable,13 and must be 
clearly and absolutely excluded; and 
• Methods of medical treatment including diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods of treatment 
(already excludable under TRIPS).14 
                                                           
10
 Key theoretical analyses are Arrow 1962, Boldrin and Levine 2004 and Bonatti and Comino 2011. The major empirical analyses 
are well summarized in López 2009. For a much fuller discussion of this argument, and the range of relevant evidence see Moir 
2013c: Chapter 2.  
11
 Some argue that without patents many inventions would be kept secret. This does not hold water from an economic perspective. 
Boldrin and Levine (2013: 9-10) cogently argue, as others have before them, that it would be irrational to patent an invention that 
can be kept secret. The history of innovation shows that inventors and innovators exchange ideas as a matter of course and that 
secrecy, where it occurs, normally only occurs in the last stages of commercialisation. 
12
 For example in 1959 the Australian High Court diluted the “manner of manufacture” test to a test that today is little more than 
the ability to make money (National Research Development Corp. v. Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR. 252).  
13
 In the USA the 1980 Supreme Court’s Diehr decision spelled a radical break in patent policy – and one that was inconsistent with 
advice the government had accepted from the 1966 President's Commission on the Patent System ("To Promote the Progress of 
…Useful Arts" in an Age of Exploding Technology) (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). Similarly in Australia the government 
accepted recommendations from a 1984 patent review committee (IPAC 1984) not to extend patents to software –indeed this had 
bi-partisan support. This did not prevent Australian courts from subsequently making decisions which mean that all software is 
today patentable in Australia – indeed there is no requirement for a pretence that software is not software, as there is in the USA 
and Europe. Relevant decisions are Re International Business Machines Corporation v Patrick Anselm Smith, Commissioner of 
Patents [1991] FCA 625 (13 December 1991) and Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1168 (22 June 1994). In TRIPS, it was 
clear that software lay in the copyright area (see Article 10 and also New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development 2002).  
14
 Only the USA and Australia allow methods of medical treatment to be patented (http://www.fbrice.com.au/publication/  
Education_Series_-_Number_three__Patents_for_Methods_of_Medical_Treatment_of_Humans.aspx). In the USA there are legal provisions 
ensuring medical practitioners cannot be sued for infringement of such patents. There are no parallel protections for medical 
practitioners in Australia.  
The first-best option for a 
focussed and efficient patent 
system is to limit patents to 
highly codified inventions with 
large lumpy R&D costs. This 
first-best option is denied by 
TRIPS Article 27.1. 
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Only the first of these exclusions contravenes TRIPS. 
A special comment is needed in regard to granting patents for methods of using previously patented things. 
For example, when a patent is granted for a pharmaceutical compound, the privileges granted to the 
patent owner allow the prevention of all commercial uses of that compound in the market where the 
patent holds. To then grant a further patent for specific uses of the patented compound is to allow double-
dipping, providing a far more extensive period of market exclusivity than ever envisaged by parliaments. 
Only in the rarest of cases should such a patent be granted – where there is a surprising result providing 
new knowledge or substantial net consumer benefits and where there are substantial experimentation or 
other costs in developing the new use.   
2.3 Requiring genuine inventiveness 
The goal of inducing technological innovation that would not otherwise take place is quite straightforward 
in policy (if not in political) terms. But the use of the inventive step as a proxy to ensure that the benefits 
should exceed the costs requires discussion. If the spillover benefits from the patented technology are high 
enough, then a patented invention will produce dynamic spillovers exceeding static efficiency losses. For a 
patent system to provide a net benefit to a nation there needs to be a strong likelihood that each granted 
patent provides social benefits greater than the social costs.15  
If a technological limitation were combined with a high inventiveness requirement, the benefit-cost 
outcome of patent systems could be considerably improved. This assumes that a high inventiveness 
requirement is a good workable proxy for large lumpy R&D outlays and high-speed imitation.  
TRIPS requires countries to use the criteria of novelty, inventiveness and industrial application that have led 
to the very low inventiveness standard operating today. In many countries patents are being granted – in 
very large volumes – for all kinds of "inventions" that seem quite obvious in the ordinary meaning of that 
word. The issue of very low patent quality – a mere scintilla of inventiveness – has been well documented 
(by, for example, Pilch 2003; Lunney 2004; Blonder 2005; Quillen Jr. 2006; Lawson 2008; Lunney and 
Johnson 2012; Moir 2013c). The effect of years of lowering the definition of “inventiveness”  to a set of 
complex legal rules has been to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Only applications which can be 
proved by patent examiners, on the basis of written documentation, against a lower than normal definition 
of “obvious”, are rejected. There are estimates that some 85 percent of granted patents contain virtually 
no new knowledge or know-how. This comes as a surprise to many economists, who assume that the 
inventive step does indeed require inventiveness.16 It would also be a surprise to most law-makers. The 
Australian parliament was recently advised that patents, because they provide a powerful exclusive right, 
are granted only for things that are "a significant advance over what is known or used".17 This is simply 
untrue (Moir 2013c). 
If the goal of patent policy is to grant patents only for those inventions which contain a benefit to the 
nation which exceeds the cost of the monopoly provided, then the "inventiveness" standard needs to be 
set to require at least a reasonable quantum of new knowledge or know-how. TRIPS allows WTO members 
full flexibility in defining and implementing the three traditional patentability criteria. 
What happens in patent law and administration is little discussed but critical to the height of the inventive 
step. While the process of construing applications involves identifying what is different from existing 
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 Lawyers often imply – or indeed state as a fact – that it is the publication of the patent specification which constitutes the 
compensation to the public to offset the static efficiency losses. But if the patent specification contains no (or very little) new 
knowledge or know-how, then its publication is of no value and cannot offset the static efficiency loss.  
16
 A view tellingly illustrated in a cleverly designed study which uses reported yields on patented new corn varieties as a proxy for 
the quantum of inventiveness. The authors were surprised that the distribution of the granted patents showed a virtually normal 
distribution around a mean of zero improvement (Moser et al. 2013: 3). Their surprise is evident in comments referring to 
discussions with examiners which confirmed to them that an invention did not have to be an improvement to be patentable.  
17
 Explanatory Memorandum to the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011, p. 42. 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/s837_ems_561ef790-9811-43d0-b14f-04c924723c94/upload_pdf/  
356916em.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. Explanatory memoranda play a critical role in interpreting statute law and are an 
essential component of any draft legislation presented to the Australian parliament.  
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knowledge (prior art), subsequent steps do not involve either the question "is it inventive?" or "what new 
knowledge has been contributed?" Patent statutes have imported a totally different question from case 
law. The Australian statute and the European Patent Convention (EPC) state that a patent application is 
taken to be inventive unless it is shown to be obvious.18 The onus of proof therefore lies with the patent 
office to show that an application is not patentable, rather than with the applicant to show that a patent is 
merited. This presumption of inventiveness sets up the wrong question, rejecting only those applications 
which can be demonstrated to fail the very narrow patent obviousness test. While the normal rule of law is 
that words take their ordinary meanings, somehow patent law has managed to evade this rule. The patent 
law definition of obvious is far narrower than the normal meaning of the word.19 
No amount of refinement to the question "is it obvious" will overcome the fact that it is the wrong question 
and is clearly ineffective in limiting patents to genuinely inventive applications (see Figure 1). Under current 
patent doctrines only those applications to the left of the red BB line are refused patents. But if the patent 
system targeted only genuine inventions, then only those applications to the right of the blue AA line would 
be patented. Applications lying between red BB and blue AA are the many trivial patents that are so 
problematic to the overall efficiency and effectiveness of patent systems. An example can assist in 
clarifying. Another subjective dimension is that which runs from ugly to beautiful. Determining a short-list 
of who is beautiful cannot be done by removing from the set only those deemed ugly.  
Figure 1: Distribution of inventions by current and proposed tests 
 
 
Inventiveness / new knowledge Low High 
# of inventions 












If the wrong question is currently being asked, there is no point tinkering with its myriad details, from the 
requirement that the inventiveness judge have no imagination,20 to the rules determining just what sub-set 
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 The Australian Patents Act 1990 states "For the purposes of this Act, an invention [application] is to be taken to involve an 
inventive step when compared with the prior art base unless the invention would have been obvious to a person skilled in the 
relevant art in the light of …" Section 7(2), emphasis added. EPC Article 56 states: "An invention [application] shall be considered as 
involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art" (emphasis added). 
19
 Indeed an Australian Federal Court judge discounted the weight of expert evidence as the expert witnesses did not understand 
the patent law meaning of obvious (Welcome Real-Time SA v. Catuity Inc, [2001] FCA 445 (17 May 2001)) para 154. 
20
 A rule overturned in the USA in 2007 (KSR v. Teleflex 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007)) but still operating elsewhere.  
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of existing knowledge is allowable as "prior art". These rules – established by courts rather than through 
careful policy design – have resulted in systems biased to the grant of uninventive patents, radically 
affecting the economic impact of the patent system (FTC 2003). 
A parsimonious patent system would recast the test for inventiveness into a positive form. This would place 
the onus of proof on the applicant, who is seeking the authority of government to exercise a right to 
exclude others from the market. Although the quantum of inventiveness is essentially a subjective 
measure, it can be constrained to a greater degree of objectivity by asking “what is the new knowledge 
contributed?” Further, the minimum quantum required can be calibrated by explicitly recognising that the 
grant of a patent imposes costs on other innovating firms and on consumers. This would focus the process 
of examination (and any subsequent court disputes) on identifying the benefit arising from the invention, 
either in terms of new knowledge contributed or a contribution to net consumer surplus, such as a 
significant increase in health outcomes. This focus could be further emphasised by requiring examiners to 
make a clear statement as to why a patent grant is merited. There is a public cost associated with each 
patent grant and these administrative decisions should not be made without full public justification.  
Countries must be free to set the inventive step at a high level. A strong inventive step requirement 
includes at least the following: 
• Replace the dysfunctionally low "is it obvious" test with a positive test based on the questions:  
 "what new knowledge or social benefit is contributed?" and  
 "is this benefit sufficient to outweigh the costs of reduced competition?" 
• Patent statutes should not set up any presumptions as to the merits of any application. The merit must 
be demonstrated by the applicant.  
• All exclusions from existing knowledge for patentability tests should be removed – the whole concept 
of “prior art” needs to be abandoned and replaced with the normal meaning of “the body of existing 
knowledge”. It is entirely inappropriate, particularly in today’s highly inventive age, to tilt the playing 
field against the public interest before applying tests for patentability.  
• The following claims must be specified as falling below the inventiveness threshold: 
 new uses of known things or processes (including use in new environments) 
(in particular new therapeutic treatments using known compounds); and 
 combinations of known elements or processes (including new forms of known things) 
(unless an unexpected outcome delivers sufficient spillover benefits to outweigh the costs of 
reduced competition). 
• Examiners should be required, in authorising a patent grant, to specify clearly the benefit which will 
pass to the public from the invention (either the new knowledge contributed or the substantial 
improvement in other outcomes such as health). Such documents should be part of the public record. 
These principles do not have nice sharp unarguable boundaries. But nor does the current "not obvious" 
system. Further the current system has developed built-in complexity, increasing costs for business and the 
community alike. Over the centuries since ordinary courts have adjudicated on these matters they have 
systematically avoided making precise definitions of what is patentable. They have developed a number of 
specific tests, many of which have later been replaced as insufficiently useful. The key issue is that at the 
end of the day patents should be granted only when it is clear they have at least some chance of 
producing external benefits to offset the costs they impose on other firms and on consumers.  
The proposed approach would make it harder for applicants to demonstrate the merit of many inventions. 
But for genuinely inventive inventions – for example for pharmaceuticals which produce a genuine 
improvement in efficacy – there should be no difficulty. The intent of these reforms is to eliminate trivial 
workshop modifications and improvements, not to stop the grant of patents for genuine inventions. This 
approach will clean much of the rubbish out of the system, making life simpler and easier for innovating 
firms. No longer will firms have to acquire large patent portfolios to swap with their competitors so they 
can all proceed as though the patent system does not exist. These activities simply divert resources away 
from productive R&D and into non-productive regulatory activity. Where a firm (or individual) has made a 
8 
genuine advance in technology there should be no difficulty in demonstrating the benefit and gaining the 
patent privilege. 
What would be ideal would be to experiment with approaches along these lines. At present 
experimentation to ensure that the inventive step balances costs and benefits is actively discouraged, 
particularly by "Big Pharma" backed up by the United States Trade Representative (USTR).21 Such 
experimentation would be useful in developing workable practices to implement the positive "is it inventive 
enough?" test. It would be ideal if at least a sub-set of countries could be allowed to experiment without 
incurring trade sanctions. Ideally these would be either countries which have relatively small markets (for 
example Australia which is two per cent of the OECD market and just one per cent of the global 
pharmaceutical market), which do not have an embedded tradition of granting patents for every trivial 
variation (for example India) or countries which can start with a clean slate (new WTO members with no 
history of patent privileges such as Cambodia, Laos or Taiwan).  
2.4 Privileges 
2.4.a The range of privileges 
The patent system is a very blunt instrument – providing an incentive for one party's invention by 
preventing commercial exploitation of the invention by other parties, even where it is independently 
invented. An efficient patent system will ensure that the privileges conferred by the patent are well 
targeted and parsimonious. Privileges that are not needed to create the R&D incentive must be avoided 
because of the high risk that they will unnecessarily impede the inventive activities of others.  
TRIPS spells out the privileges which must be embodied in the patent grant. The patent owner must be 
allowed to prevent third parties from "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" the patented 
invention unless permission has been granted (Article 28).22 These are the privileges which were conferred 
well over a century ago when the local working condition was the norm in patent systems. Local working 
required that a patented invention be actually produced in the country. This requirement had the effect of 
creating pathways along which knowledge benefits could spill over to other firms and craftspeople. 
Generally if a patent was not worked within a period of (usually) three years, any other party could seek to 
use the patented invention. Over recent decades local working has come into disfavour as being an implicit 
form of non-tariff barrier. While there is a certain element of truth in this perspective, this would be more 
persuasive if the privileges granted had been re-assessed when the local working requirement was 
removed. With no local working requirement, there will frequently be no benefit to the patent-granting 
nation. The patent thus becomes a simple rent-extraction device regardless of the returns already made on 
the R&D investment. It simply leads to income flows from technology-importing nations.23 In such 
situations it is questionable whether a patent system achieves its goal of increased R&D investment. If this 
effect is sufficiently large – for example in economies where most patented inventions are imported – it 
can make a nation much worse off. The technology-exporting nation thus benefits from spillovers at home 
and rent-extraction from overseas – a kind of double-dipping.  
An example illustrates. In Australia, where term extensions are regularly granted for pharmaceutical 
compounds, the situation can frequently arise where a compound is out of patent in an overseas economy 
but still in patent in Australia. Generic companies are prevented from making the product for export to the 
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overseas market until the patent ceases in Australia.24 This situation makes generic companies operating 
from Australia less globally competitive than those in overseas countries where the patent has already 
expired. The benefit to the patent owner is small: it ensures that Australian generic companies will be 
delayed in their local market entry after the patent has expired. This delay – which occurs for a range of 
practical reasons – is effectively an unapproved extension of the already lengthy patent term.  
The core of the privilege conferred on the patent owner is the privilege to prevent others from 
undermining the higher price that can be charged when competition is restrained. This is the action of 
selling in the jurisdiction where the patent has been granted.  
This raises the issue of parallel importing and whether it is 
appropriate for governments to support business models designed to 
raise prices for their own consumers. Where a global company owns 
patents in a number of countries it is likely to set prices differentially.  
Such "what the market will bear" pricing models are a long way from 
the economists' welfare-maximising world of marginal-cost pricing. 
One consequence is parallel importing – where retailers act on 
opportunities to import officially produced goods (i.e. goods 
produced with the authority of the patent holder) if they can source 
these more cheaply. Naturally this undercuts demand for the higher-
priced goods sold directly by the patent holder.  
At present TRIPS leaves countries free to determine when patent (and other intellectual property) 
privileges are exhausted. The import of patented goods manufactured under license elsewhere does not 
undermine the patent privilege of sale in the market where the patent has been granted.25 But if similar 
goods are imported from a country where the patent has not been granted – that is they are not produced 
under license – their sale would contravene the granted privilege of sale in the protected market.  
The net cost of patent systems was considerably increased by removing local working requirements 
without also streamlining the privileges granted. The preferred approach of limiting the patent privilege to 
sale would require an amendment to TRIPS. Developing economies – and economies with strongly negative 
balances on intangibles trade – would do well to flag the desire to amend Article 28 of TRIPS so that the 
only right granted by a patent is the right to prevent sale into the market where the patent has been 
granted. This more limited privilege needs to be carefully worded to make it clear that it does not limit the 
freedom countries have to determine when patent rights are exhausted.  
2.4.b The patent term 
Turning now to the time period of the patent privilege, it was the pharmaceutical industry that successfully 
lobbied both for “technological neutrality” and for a 20 year patent term in TRIPS. A major argument for 
the longer patent term was delays in patent processing and in regulatory approval of marketed drugs. This 
industry also drove the data exclusivity provisions provided in TRIPS Article 39. Once a patent has expired, 
other firms have the right to sell into the market from the day after the patent ceases. Perversely, 
preparations for sale as soon as the patent has expired appear to be unlawful in some jurisdictions, possibly 
due to the right to prevent manufacture. Such interpretations of patent law effectively extend the patent 
term. Data exclusivity provisions were introduced into the USA in 1984 following a court case where the 
right to prepare for immediate market entry was determined to be an infringement of the patent 
privileges.26 In response the US Congress passed the "Hatch-Waxman Act" (Public Law 98-417) which 
provides an explicit authority for generic drug companies to obtain marketing approval by demonstrating 
both bioequivalence to approved drugs and Good Manufacturing Practice procedures. This allows generic 
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companies to rely on the safety and efficacy demonstrations of the brand clinical trial data. In exchange 
brand companies were granted a 5-year period of data exclusivity, during which generic companies cannot 
use brand clinical trial data to obtain marketing approval.  
It is, in fact, unethical to require unnecessary trials on human or animal subjects. International ethical 
standards for clinical trials forbid doctors to continue experiments on humans when there is already 
“conclusive proof of positive and beneficial results.”27 It would therefore be unethical to ever require 
generic companies to undertake their own clinical trials. While brand companies pay for a large part of the 
cost of expensive clinical trials, they usually more than recoup these costs during the period when 
competition is suppressed by the underlying patent. These data are required by public health authorities 
for public purposes – to ensure that marketed medicines are both safe and better than a placebo. Why data 
provided for a public purpose can be presumed to be the commercial asset of a private company is unclear. 
This is particularly the case for pharmaceuticals, a notoriously secretive industry.28 Indeed it would be ideal 
for all such data to be placed in the public domain for use by independent medical researchers (Goldacre 
2012).  
Notwithstanding its success in designing the global patent system to meet its own needs, the 
pharmaceutical industry has succeeded in obtaining two further advantages, each based on the principle of 
using government powers to limit market competition. Despite the technological neutrality provisions of 
TRIPS, the USA has sought and gained, through FTAs, the right of a patent term extension of up to 5 years 
for pharmaceutical products where there have been delays in achieving regulatory approval for market 
entry. The very generalised terms of TRIPS Article 39 have since been solidified and extended through trade 
agreements. Data exclusivity provisions give pharmaceutical companies far stronger, and cheaper, market 
monopolies than do patents. Indeed it is arguable that this is a form of double-dipping and that a patent-
protected drug should not also be able to claim data exclusivity.   
Patent privileges should be provided only where they are needed to induce an invention. Following this 
principle, term extensions should be provided only where the patent owner provides financial data to 
government showing that a risk-adjusted return on the R&D investment has not yet been achieved. 
Similarly, data exclusivity provisions should be conditional on proof that a commercial return on the 
R&D outlay has not yet been achieved.  
2.5 Incentives, penalties and strategic gaming 
The essence of patent policy is the incentive to change investment behaviour. Because of this the normal 
rules of law (for criminal behaviour or contracts over physical property) will not always deliver good 
outcomes. In economics the dangers of regulatory intervention in markets are well-known and so clear 
evidence of a net increase in welfare is required to justify the intervention. In addition the cost of the 
intervention must be less than that of any alternative means of achieving the goals. If these two criteria 
cannot be achieved, then a country will be worse off for adopting the intervention. "Clear evidence" aligns 
with the legal standard "beyond reasonable doubt." Lawyers are reluctant to use this standard outside 
criminal law. But a granted patent provides a powerful exclusive right that can impact strongly on firms 
which have not been a party to the decision to grant a monopoly. The patent privilege is the right to 
prevent others from commercially exploiting a particular area of technology.29 A very high standard of 
proof is therefore indicated.  
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2.5.a Incentives to maintain patent standards 
A range of incentives and disincentives are embedded in the patent system. These are rarely discussed. 
There is a major asymmetry in the incentive to challenge an invalidly granted patent compared to the 
incentive to sue for infringement. If a patent-holder sues for infringement and wins s/he gains all the 
consequent benefits (damages, costs, payment of license fees and a greater ease in obtaining license fees 
from other parties). Where an innovating firm finds their business path blocked by a seemingly invalid 
patent, s/he would bear all the costs and risks of legal action yet instantly share all the benefits of 
revocation (clearer market access) with all other companies competing in that field. There is one exception. 
The US Hatch-Waxman Act provides an incentive to companies which successfully challenge an invalid 
pharmaceutical patent – they gain a period of 180 days of market exclusivity for their generic version.30 In 
the very large US market this potential reward substantially exceeds the cost of legal proceedings.  
In other technology fields, and in other jurisdictions, this asymmetry 
in incentives removes any incentive for those negatively affected by 
patents to help to maintain standards – most weak patents are never 
challenged. In some jurisdictions an alternative strategy has been 
developed which is effective in helping to remove invalid patents 
from the system – pre-grant opposition. As the European Patent 
Office (EPO) experience shows, when such low-cost procedures are 
well designed, they are actively used (see, for example, Wagner 
2008). Pre-grant opposition is infrequently used in the USA where 
there are major weaknesses in system design – anyone using pre-
grant opposition loses rights in subsequent court actions.  
Another perverse incentive is that a firm whose patent is found to be invalid has to recompense only the 
other party to the legal dispute. The many other firms also negatively affected by the invalid patent would 
each have to go to court to seek compensation. That is, there is no general procedure for firms with 
invalidated patents to repay in full the unjustified profits they have made. This is not only inefficient and 
unfair but also encourages firms to seek many dubious patents – the profits from these far exceed any 
costs if a patent is found invalid. As the recent example of the patents over BRACA1 and BRACA2 genes 
shows, patents can be used for most of their market life before they are found fully or partially invalid. In 
contrast, where a firm is found to infringe a valid patent, one form of compensation is the payment of all 
profits derived from this infringement. These clearly asymmetrical penalty structures lead to a situation 
that actively encourages firms to seek patents for trivial inventions. Indeed the strategy of legally defending 
very low quality pharmaceutical patents is actively recommended to pharmaceutical firms as the profits 
from the additional time in the market during protracted legal wrangling will far exceed the legal costs.31 
Little consideration appears to have been given to the role of these perverse incentives in undermining the 
objective of patent policy. There are "fair basis" rules that limit unfair use of divisionals and amendments, 
and in the USA there are penalties for deliberately misleading the patent office. But there are no other 
penalties for profiting from an invalidly granted patent, although this can substantially harm many 
consumers as well as other innovative firms. Nor are there penalties for undermining the system itself and 
substituting semantics for technology, pretending software is not software, or pretending that discoveries 
can be classed as inventions (e.g. DNA). Indeed in some jurisdictions applicants appear to be able to amend 
patent claims endlessly, seeking for a form of words that will gain the approval of the examiner.  
Endless amendment32 combines with the lack of any means of recouping profits from invalid patents to 
create a form of moral hazard – strong incentives to seek patents for "inventions" that fall far short of 
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delivering any benefit. Firms successfully challenging a patent will be awarded damages, but as noted 
above other parties have no cheap or simple avenue to seek compensation.33  
In Australia the right to amend a patent claim was introduced in 1953 
and this policy change has never been evaluated. My study of the 
doctrines leading to the grant of patents for “inventions” which 
contribute no new knowledge indicates that many of these would 
never be granted if the right of amendment were limited (Moir 
2013b). Where there is an error that might prejudice grant to an 
otherwise inventive application, a single right to amendment could 
be allowed in special circumstances. Apart from this single instance, 
any further amendments should not be allowed. 
There is also considerable "doctrinal incoherence" (silly outcomes) in the patent system. Thambisetty notes 
a UK case where the failed challenger of a patent's validity had to pay damages for infringement even after 
the patent had been revoked after a successful subsequent challenge.34 This is economic policy gone mad.  
When tax is erroneously under-estimated there are well-established mechanisms for repayment (including 
with penalties depending on the circumstances). When social security payments are made in error, these 
are recouped. Providing a parallel mechanism for ensuring that patent-holders do not benefit from 
unjustified monopolies would substantially change the incentive for firms to seek more and more patents 
for trivial "inventions". 
A low inventive step encourages Type II errors – grant of a patent for an application which would happen 
anyway or where there are insufficient spillover benefits to offset costs (a “bad” application). In contrast a 
high inventive step risks Type I errors – rejection of "desirable" applications (those contributing new 
knowledge from which other firms and inventors can benefit) (Jensen and Webster 2004). A closely related 
issue is who bears the cost of correcting administrative errors? 
All jurisdictions provide substantial opportunities for rejected patent applicants to challenge an 
unfavourable decision. With Type I errors it is the party seeking the monopoly privilege who bears all costs 
and risks of seeking a second opinion and who will gain the full return if successful. In contrast, where the 
inventive step is low and Type II errors are more likely, it is innocent third parties who bear the costs of 
dealing with incorrect decisions. As noted above there is very little incentive for such corrections.  
This situation could be radically changed if patent holders 
were required to repay all profits ever earned from any 
invalid patent. After reimbursing the challenging firm for 
legal and other costs in the challenge, the balance could be 
shared between the challenging firm, other firms in the 
market who had suffered damage from the invalid patent 
and agencies representing competition and consumer 
interests. It is, after all, consumers and competitors who 
bear the costs of the patent system.  
Outside of pharmaceutical patents, the incentive to challenge bad patents has been particularly low in the 
USA where granted patents have a presumption of validity (Jaffe and Lerner 2004). This adds substantially 
to the costs and risks of a third party challenger.  
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The Australian patent statute expressly states that there is no 
presumption of validity in the fact that a patent has been granted.35 
Despite this a Federal Court judge has recently qualified this express 
disclaimer stating that “[r]egistration of the patent is, of itself, prima 
facie evidence of validity.”36 Again this indicates that (some) judges 
have little hesitation in changing the law, regardless of the express 
wording of the statute. As Quillen noted in relation to judicially 
determined extensions to patentable subject matter in the USA such 
judicial policy-making occurs "without any inquiry into the facts" or 
the public policy implications (Quillen Jr. 2008: 71). When policy is 
made in this manner it is no wonder it creates unbalanced, sub-
optimal, outcomes.  
There is no such legal presumption about a claim to infringement in the USA. This means that the standard 
of proof required for the alleged infringing party is higher ("clear and convincing evidence") than it is for the 
patent-holder ("preponderance of the evidence").37 History shows that patent offices tend to grant many 
patents which courts subsequently find invalid. Quillen (2006) reports on a 1980 study – prior to the 
creation of the pro-patent Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) – by Koenig (1980) which 
calculated that US appeal courts found nearly two-thirds of patents challenged for validity were in fact 
invalid. This is an extremely high error rate. Patent offices work closely with those who seek patents and 
those who assist would-be patent-holders. But they have little contact with innovating firms which are 
harmed by the grant of invalid patents. These factors probably underlie problematic outcomes such as 
"Swiss medical claims" where the Swiss Patent Office designed a set of words which could be used to 
undermine the clear intent of the EPC (see below).  
2.5.b Penalties for infringement 
Penalties for infringement are well developed in patent systems. The tension between the economic goal of 
disseminating new knowledge and technology and the competitive restraint provided by a patent 
traditionally meant that the usual penalty for infringement was payment of royalties. This simultaneously 
ensured a proper incentive for the inventor and the more widespread use of the technology.  
In the USA there has been a tendency to issue injunctions as a remedy for patent infringement since the 
precedent-setting penalties in the 1986 Kodak-Polaroid case. From an economic policy perspective this 
seems disproportionate – injunctions involve an extremely high cost to many innocent parties, particularly 
those who lose their jobs. Similarly, since the Texas Instruments case in 1985-86 extraordinarily high levels 
of damages have been awarded in the USA.38 Again it is hard to see how excessively high levels of damages 
achieve anything other than encouragement to abuse the patent system. In 2006 the Supreme Court acted 
to stop the use of injunctions except in exceptional circumstances.39 This experience, and the lengthy delay 
between the CAFC adopting a policy of regularly using injunctions and the Supreme Court acting to 
constrain the use of injunctions, points to the need for clear specification of appropriate remedies for 
infringement in patent statutes.  
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Patent policy is clearly civil law, implementing economic policy. Any 
action which undermines the granted rights can cause an economic 
loss to the privilege-holder – a matter pursued through civil courts. 
The introduction of criminal penalties into copyright law was an 
accident of history.40 Unfortunately it has spread globally and patent 
privilege-holders are now seeking its extension to trade secrets.41 
There is no sound reason for this. There has already been a massive 
upset to the normal rule of law in TRIPS Article 34 where the 
"innocent until proven guilty" standard no longer applies in respect 
of process patents. Because of the damage patents can cause to 
other innovating firms, it is important that infringement penalties be 
as parsimonious as the privileges granted. They need to be focused 
on compensation for the lost earnings that constitute the patent 
incentive. They must avoid damage to innocent third parties (such as 
employees). Nor should patent policy ever been seen as criminal law.  
2.5.c Strategic games playing: semantics 
The lack of clearly thought through incentives and disincentives in the patent system combines with the 
(possibly deliberate) lack of policy-oriented data to ensure substantial strategic games playing. Such games 
range from the deliberate flouting of patent statutes (for example "Swiss medical claims") through 
evergreening to frequent but low-level games where semantic inventiveness replaces technological 
inventiveness.  
When one starts studying the patent system one of the first striking 
aspects is its peculiarly archaic language. "Art" is used to mean 
technology, though "prior art" means allowable existing knowledge. 
If judges used modern language – such as technology for technology 
– might they have been more circumspect in extending patent 
privileges to fields such as business methods? Certainly business is an 
art, but it is not a technology in any normal sense of the word.  
Members of the patent community strongly resist attempts to modernise the language. It appears that 
continued use of archaic language is integral to the complexity which prevents outsiders from enquiring too 
closely into the costs and benefits of the patent system. For example using the phrase "prior art" for 
"allowable existing knowledge" hides the limits placed on existing knowledge before the novelty and 
inventiveness tests are applied.  
While semantic problems bedevil rules and procedures, arguments about shades of meaning in words are 
also frequently found during the examination process. Such complaints are not new, but remain 
unaddressed. Edwards, for example, comments that: "[a]s it reaches the patent office the application 
combines technological and legal invention, and the latter, if of superior quality, may do much to offset 
deficiencies in the former" (Edwards 1949: 218). My own empirical work has focused on business method 
patents, which not being a technology might be more subject to such linguistic arguments. Nonetheless the 
examples found there are startling. In three out of four cases where the European Patent Office (EPO) 
granted a patent for the proposed business "invention" the application was initially rejected as not 
technically inventive. But when specific words were moved from dependent to independent claims 
suddenly a patent was granted (Moir 2013a). Unfortunately EPO examiners do not have to give any reason 
for grant of a patent, so one cannot interrogate the underlying thinking. Certainly from a policy viewpoint 
there can be no benefit to the public in the grant of a patent where "inventiveness" is based on narrow 
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shades of linguistic meaning, or which claim specific words are in, rather than genuine technological 
invention.  
Some types of semantic inventiveness are used at a strategic level and have system-wide impacts. For 
example the EPC limits the patentability of methods of medical treatment. But the EPO grant patents for 
the first medical use of a known substance. This seems at odds with the wording of Article 53: 
"European patents shall not be granted in respect of: … 
(c) methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic 
methods practised on the human or animal body; this provision shall not apply to products, in 
particular substances or compositions, for use in any of these methods." 
Clearly Article 53 allows pharmaceutical products, for use in such treatments, to be patented. Given that 
the product patent covers all commercial uses, further patents for methods of using the product seems to 
reward the inventor twice. Quite how the EPO came to interpret these words as allowing patents for 
particular uses of patentable pharmaceutical products is unclear. Setting aside this conundrum about 
patents for first medical uses of patented compounds, Thambisetty indicates that "as a response to 
pressure from the pharmaceutical industry the EPO was interested in extending patent product protection 
to second medical use of known products" (Thambisetty 2009: 17, emphasis added). She provides an 
example of the minor variation in wording designed by the Swiss Patent Office to overcome this exclusion 
(a technique known as "Swiss medical claims"). This comes very close to those who are supposed to uphold 
the law taking action to undermine it. It is possible largely because the patent system's deliberate 
complexity hides it from proper accountability. 
Some of the decisions of the quasi courts of the EPO (the Technical Boards of Appeal) involve at least 
substantial mental gymnastics – though some consider the EPO "outright violates the European Patent 
Convention" (Bakels 2012: 2). Such semantic games have been roundly criticised by UK courts. In the most 
strongly worded of these admonitions, Prescott J stated that "[y]ou are not allowed to get round the 
objection – that you are attempting to patent a computer program – by claiming it as a physical artefact, a 
mere change of form."42 
Stepping back from the patent system one is reminded of the 
"creative accounting" of the late 1970s and early 1980s that allowed 
payment of tax liabilities to be discretionary for many of those with 
highly trained tax lawyers. The public revulsion over the existence of 
choice in the payment of tax led to a substantial degree of reform 
with overarching principles trumping specific rules. Thus "anti-
avoidance" principles deem specific financial arrangements void for 
tax purposes if their principle purpose is to avoid payment of tax. The 
semantic games in the patenting industry seem designed to obtain 
patent monopolies for trivial "inventions". They could be addressed 
with similar approaches.43 
2.6 Transparency, evaluation and audit 
One reason economists are so reluctant to endorse regulatory interventions in markets is that such 
interventions create the opportunity to benefit financially from how the rules are shaped. This encourages 
beneficiaries to lobby to change the rules even further in their favour. Adding insult to injury, the costs of 
this lobbying are tax deductible. Classes of agents arise to argue which side of the regulatory boundary 
their client should be on.44 These agents also develop vested interests. In the USA they persuaded Congress 
to drop a proposal to investigate the real-world impact of granting patents for business methods.45 Such 
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regulatory capture creates a vicious cycle favouring sectional interests rather than the public good. The 
patent system is an excellent example of this.  
There is no tradition of proper oversight of the activities of patent offices from a competition perspective. 
Patent offices are usually located in industry portfolios making them particularly susceptibility to regulatory 
capture. Formal statements from patent offices suggest they do not see consumers or non-patenting 
innovators among their "stakeholders". Several well-informed students of the patent system suggest that 
patent offices have become part of an in-grown self-reinforcing community impervious to (and generally 
unaware of) the evidence as to possible negative impacts from the current "strong"46 system (Thambisetty 
2009; Drahos 2010).47 To offset these continuing pressures patent systems need clear built-in systems for 
effective oversight, including audit and evaluation, and mechanisms to draw them into wider policy circles.  
2.6.a Collect data on the impact of patents 
An entirely unacceptable aspect of patent systems, given that they have been a tool of economic policy for 
several hundred years, is the lack of data on patent use and patent costs for use in improving the design of 
patent policy. There have been recommendations to collect such data but these have rarely been 
implemented.48 Indeed there are suggestions that well-organised beneficiaries of an increasingly broad 
patent system have actively undermined such proposals.49 It seems quite extraordinary that governments 
hand out thousands of monopolies yet collect no data on their use.50  
Little of the reams of data on patent applications provided by patent 
offices is useful for policy purposes. None give any insight into how 
the granted monopolies are used.51 It would be a very simple 
administrative procedure – virtually tick-a-box – to require at least 
some data on use as patents are renewed. While this might be 
onerous for companies who own many thousands of patents,52 if the 
system is to be based on evidence rather than myth, then such data 
are essential. An alternative which would be cheaper for frequent 
patenters, though it might disclose more information, would be to 
require advance advice to the patent office before any legal action 
was taken to enforce a patent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
body) from undertaking a study of business method patenting. This had been part of the penultimate draft of the American 
Inventors Protection Act 1999 but was removed in the final statute (Kahin 2003). 
46
 "Strong" in this context means strong rights for patent-holders and very weak protection for consumers and competitors.  
47
 A telling example of the isolation of the patent community, even from the world of industrial innovation, is the 2008 Australian 
National Innovation System (NIS) review (Cutler et al. 2008). Simultaneously IP Australia's advisory body was charged with 
reviewing what subject matter should be patentable (ACIP 2008). Although IP Australia is part of the Department of Industry and 
Innovation, responsible for the NIS review, members of the NIS review team were unaware of the ACIP review and the ACIP review 
team was ignorant of the NIS review – until I took action to cross-inform them.  
48
 For example collection of use data at the time of patent renewal was recommended in 1984 in Australia (IPAC 1984: 10). This 
recommendation has never been implemented. Yet in his speech at the first Pacific Rim Innovation Conference (January 2010), the 
Director General of IP Australia went on the public record regretting the lack of data on patent use.  
49
 Bessen and Meurer (2008, p.293-4) comment that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recommendation most prominently 
rejected by the Intellectual Property Owners Association (dominated by patent lawyers from large firms) was recommendation 10 
"expand consideration of economic learning and competition policy concerns in patent law decisionmaking." See also footnote 45.  
50
 And never have, except for a brief period in Canada following the Firestone (1971) review. 
51
 Indeed in Europe (certainly using the UK and EPO search systems) it is not possible for an innovator to search a particular 
technology area (whether by technology class or keywords) and obtain a list of all patents currently valid in that country. The 
esp@cenet database will not return more than 500 entries and does not allow searching by grant status. The European Patent 
Register will return all hits, but also does not allow limitation by grant status – each returned case has to be searched individually 
by legal status to find which have been granted and are in force. This seems an extraordinary abrogation of the implicit duty of 
patent offices to provide public information about the patents they grant.  
52
 IBM, for example has acquired more than 67,000 patents in the last 20 years (Frier 2013). However about half these have ceased 
and many of the remainder are simply the same "invention" patented in a number of countries. A relatively small number of 
companies own a relatively large proportion of all granted patents. The 300 most frequent patenting companies owned 45 percent 
of patent grants in the period 1990 to 2001 in each of Australia and the USA – on average 206 patents in Australia and 2190 in the 
USA (calculated from Moir 2008: Table 2).  
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Despite the lack of policy-relevant data from the patent system, there are 
substantial data from surveys of industrial innovation and these throw 
considerable light on the role and importance (or lack therefore) of the 
patent system. These are well reviewed elsewhere (López 2009). What is 
surprising is that National Innovation Surveys do not build on the work of 
the Yale and Carnegie-Mellon surveys. One critically important omission is 
data on how innovating firms are affected by the patents that other 
people own. The issues of blocking and hold-up patents are widely 
understood to be important policy questions. Yet we collect no data.53 
Another important omission is data on the cost of copying. Mansfield and 
colleagues (1981) did the initial empirical work on this issue and it was 
replicated in the Yale survey (Levin et al. 1987). Since then there has been 
no new empirical work despite the importance of the cost and speed of 
copying as a motivating factor for the patent intervention. This is 
unfortunate as new technologies (such as computer-aided manufacture, 
computer-aided design and 3-D printing) and new economic players 
(China, India) may have changed the time and price of copying. 
2.6.b Regular audit and periodic evaluation 
The patent system seems to have had a remarkable ability to escape review, evaluation or audit since the 
US Senate enquiry of 1958 (Machlup 1958). This is despite the trend towards greater evaluation of 
government programs across all beneficiary groups. One reason for this is that it is not a budget-funded 
(outlays) program. Like tariff barriers, the costs are distributed across the economy. But unlike tariffs, the 
costs are not readily amenable to quantification, and relevant data are difficult to obtain. There are, 
however, three empirical studies of the welfare effect of pharmaceutical product patents (Chaudhuri et al. 
2006; Branstetter et al. 2011; Dutta 2011). All show that the consumer surplus effect is six to eight times 
greater than the producer surplus effect, indicating a substantial net welfare loss from the reduction in 
competition caused by product patents. These results suggest that a straightforward subsidy to 
pharmaceutical companies would be more efficient than the provision of patents.  
The development from the mid-1980s of a "stakeholder" culture was intended to increase the sensitivity 
and responsiveness of government agencies to the groups affected by their actions. Unfortunately for the 
patent system, this reform has simply embedded regulatory capture, with revolving doors between patent 
offices, patent attorney firms and frequent users of the patent system. Opening up this inward-looking 
culture could readily be achieved by moving patent offices from industry or legal portfolios to agencies 
charged with promoting competition. This would broaden the "stakeholder" definition to include, at a 
minimum, consumer interests and competitive voices (for example the generics medicine industry).  
In countries new to patenting, where the bulk of the applications are 
for pharmaceutical products or processes, relevant competition and 
public interest issues will most likely be handled by the health 
ministry. In such situations the objectives of ensuring balance 
between the incentive and competition elements of patent systems 
might best be achieved by locating patent offices in the ministry of 
health.  
Regular economic evaluation would further strengthen a more balanced approach to the grant of patent 
privileges. This would need to be undertaken by economists independent of the patent system and its 
beneficiaries. Organisations such as the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) are precisely the kind 
of independent bodies that should be charged with such evaluations. It was however precisely this 
independence – phrased as "they are not properly qualified" – which led to the American patent bar 
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 Though the recent European Commission study into the pharmaceutical industry places some rather large numbers on the losses 
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lobbying to prevent the GAO from being mandated to undertake a study of business method patenting.54 
Any attempt to set up an independent evaluation of any part of the patent system immediately leads to 
cries of lack of representativeness. For example the Australian Federation of Intellectual Property Attorneys 
of Australia (FICPI) took issue with the composition of the independent panel established to review the 
pharmaceutical patent system in Australia in late 2012, as "there is no representative on the panel who is 
representative of the interests of the innovation based pharmaceutical industry."55 Effectively they were 
objecting to the independence of the panel. When determining regulatory policy a fundamental issue is 
that "one must look further afield than those involved in and regulating an industry when canvassing 
opinions regarding changes in public policy" (Beggs 1981: 44). It is precisely this requirement for 
independence that the "stakeholder" groups do not understand.  
There is a place for sectional interests to lobby elected governments, but it should not extend to preventing 
the independent review and evaluation that creates the foundation for sound public policy debate. 
As well as regular evaluation there should also be a system for 
independently auditing the inventiveness standard being 
implemented by the patent office. As discussed above the incentives 
to ensure independent review of possibly erroneous decisions are 
weak. Further, in at least some countries, judges have shown 
themselves to be poor defendants of the public interest in patent 
systems. Periodic independent review of applications in specific fields 
(including both grants and borderline rejections) by experts would do 
much to ensure that the new higher standards were maintained. 
3. Comparison with TRIPS and with USTR demands 
Having defined the key elements of a balanced patent system it is useful to see how this compares both 
with TRIPS and with the aggressive patent policy demands being put forward by the USTR. With few 
exceptions the US ask has increasingly favoured patent owners, particularly pharmaceutical companies. The 
US ask in the leaked IP chapter from the TPPA round
56
 is compared to a balanced system. The current text 
is quite complex, and there is still substantial disagreement between the parties to the negotiation as to 
the content of this chapter.57  
The items identified as essential to a balanced patent system are useful in developing a schema to manage 
analysis of this complex text. This also allows different treaties, or proposed texts, to be set out in a 
comparative tabular form (see Table 1).  
3.1 Objectives 
TRIPS has perhaps the best objective statement of any legal document governing the grant of patent 
privileges. Although TRIPS covers a range of "intellectual property" interventions, Article 7 seems to be 
drafted specifically for patents. It both specifies that the subject matter of patents is technology and calls 
for balance between the interests of creators and users of new technology. 
Studies of a range of legal decisions on patents demonstrate clearly that judges have little understanding of 
the goals of this economic policy. Better guidance to judges, in the form of clearly stated objectives, could 
pay substantial dividends. There is no US proposal for IP objectives for the TPPA, though there are 
proposals from other negotiating parties.  
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 Personal conversation with a senior representative of the American patent bar, March 2011. See footnote 45.  
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 pp 1-2. As IPAustralia has dismantled this website a copy can be obtained from the author.  
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 This updated version of the paper is based on the leaked 16 May 2014 text (https://www.wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/). As presented to 
the ISS conference it was based on the leaked 13 November 2013 text (https://wikileaks.org/tpp/). Table 1 footnotes any 
differences between the 2014 and 2013 versions.  
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 As, indeed there was to the 2011 and 2013 versions. The general, copyright and patent elements of the 2011 version, together 
with disagreements between the parties, are fully discussed in Flynn et al. 2012. There have been only a few changes between the 
2011, 2013 and 2014 texts, at least with respect to the US patent ask.  
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3.2 Patentable subject matter 
Patentable subject matter is not specifically discussed in TRIPS – basically patents are to be granted for 
inventions “in any field of technology”. But some technological inventions can be deemed unpatentable – 
those that contravene the ordre public; plants, animals and biological processes for their production (but 
not microorganisms); and diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods. Implicitly software can be excluded 
as Article 10 specifically requires that copyright privileges be provided for software.  
In the TPPA the US is seeking to narrow exceptions to patentable subject matter. TRIPS allows nations to 
refuse to grant patents for plants and animals other than micro-organisms.58 Draft TPPA Article E.1.359 
requires the grant of patents for plants and animals.60 TRIPS allows nations to refuse to grant patents for 
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods. The 2013 draft TPPA had included a US proposal to allow 
patents for diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods "if they cover a method of using a machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter (Article E.1.3(b)). This inclusion was opposed by 11 of the 12 
negotiating parties and has been dropped from the 2014 draft. The 2014 draft includes a proposal from 10 
of the negotiating parties to specifically allow exclusion from patentability for diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods. The text does not indicate that the other three nations – the USA, Japan and Singapore – 
have formally opposed this.  
3.3  Inventiveness 
Patent systems can be re-designed to use an inventiveness test set to ensure each granted application 
would deliver a net benefit to the world if not to the nation.61 TRIPS is largely silent on this matter, allowing 
signatories full flexibility in designing patentability standards. TRIPS does however constrain WTO members 
to grant patents on the basis of the discredited criteria of novelty, inventiveness and utility. Few countries 
have taken the opportunity of this freedom to set patentability criteria at levels that achieve the TRIPS 
objective of “the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge” (Article 7). The 
major example of a country that has tried to do this is India, which drew on the European Medicines 
Agency’s procedures in Section 3(d) of the 2005 Patent Act.62 When this was implemented with respect to a 
single patent application, both the USA and the EU made strong representations that such a high standard 
for grant was unfair and constituted “free riding”. 
Given this response to India’s use of TRIPS flexibilities, it is not surprising that in the TPPA the US seeks to 
constrain all parties to the exact procedures it has used to create the very low inventive step in the USA. 
This constraint is hidden in a footnote that requires inventiveness to be determined on the basis of 
whether it “would have been obvious to a person skilled or having ordinary skill in the art having regard to 
the prior art." (footnote to Article E.1). Further the USA is seeking to impose its very low standards on its 
trading partners by specifically requiring that patents be granted for any new uses and methods of using 
known products – effectively eliminating any inventiveness requirement. Although India is not a party to 
these negotiations, the specific language of Article (E.1.2) is clearly directed at undermining Section 3(d) of 
the Indian Patent Act. The extraordinarily low standard that the US proposes would encourage rent-seeking 
and a shift of resources into the process of patenting rather than into genuine innovation. It would make it 
impossible for countries where the majority of patents are owned by foreign entities to design a system 
that would balance the interests of producers and users or technology, thus contravening TRIPS Article 7.  
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 TRIPS Article 27.2 also allows the exclusion of "essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than 
non-biological and microbiological processes, though it does require "protection" for plant varieties.  
59
 Each article in the leaked 2013 and 2014 versions of the IP chapter is preceded by the letters QQ. These standard letters are not 
included here.  
60
 Australia already agreed to provide patentability for plants and animals in the Australia US Free trade Agreement (AUSFTA) which 
came into effect in 2005 (the exclusion is absent from the list of allowed exclusions in Article 17.9.2).  
61
 To the world as where patented goods are imported there is little benefit to the granting nation.  
62
 This section is also drafted as a limitation to patentable subject matter rather than the required degree of inventiveness (though 
it could be interpreted as signaling that such minor variations do not meet the definition of an invention). For a discussion of the 
use of subject matter or inventiveness criteria to limit patentability see Thambisetty 2014.  
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3.4  Privileges 
TRIPS conferred extremely broad privileges on patent owners, though also provided some limited 
exclusions to these privileges. The US ask in the TPPA would limit exclusions from the broad range of patent 
privileges solely to the use of data in patents for regulatory approvals. The US opposes provisions to allow 
manufacture for export to countries where the patent is not in force. However US opposition to the overall 
provision that the TPPA shall encourage international exhaustion of rights (thus allowing parallel importing) 
has been withdrawn in the 2014 version.63 The US is also seeking to exclude anti-competitive conduct as a 
reason for revocation of a patent (Article E.3).  
Not satisfied with the TRIPS extension of all patents to 20 years to allow for processing delays, the USA is 
now seeking further patent term extensions if patent processing is delayed beyond specified limits.64 These 
might rarely come into force as most patent processing delays are due to applicants taking the maximum 
allowable time to submit each response to a negative examiner’s report. Nonetheless where there is an 
administrative oversight, this is a high price for the public to pay for any such administrative error. Any such 
requirement should be conditional on the applicant advising the patent office some (specified) months 
before the final date on which the examiner’s report is due.  
Term extensions due to marketing authority regulatory delays have been sought and gained by the USA in 
many FTAs, and are again included in the proposed TPPA. As for AUSFTA, the draft text (Addendum I, 
Article E.14) is very broadly worded. Countries are allowed to place conditions and limitations on the 
implementation of this policy. This drafting would allow countries to require evidence that a return on R&D 
investment had not yet been achieved, before granting any such term extension.  
Provisions for data exclusivity were included in TRIPS, but in the most general terms (Article 39.3). In most 
countries the timely entry of generic competitors as soon as a patent expired would be seen as good public 
policy. There would rarely be occasion to find that use of expensive undisclosed data had been on 
commercially unfair terms. Indeed requiring generic companies to undertake new clinical trials where the 
outcome was already known would be grossly unethical. In the TPPA the USA is seeking to strengthen this 
extension of monopoly privilege. Data exclusivity is to be for all undisclosed data, without any qualifiers; 
and the prohibition on use for marketing approval is now absolute for at least five years (Article E.16.1(a)). 
Data exclusivity is also to be extended, for at least three years, to variants of already approved products if 
new data are required to gain marketing approval (Article E.16.2). Limited exceptions are allowed to 
protect public health (Article E.16.3).  
The USA also has a placeholder to seek similar data monopolies for biologics (Article E.20). Currently 
periods for such differential rights are specified as 0, 5, 8 or 12 years, indicating the disagreement between 
parties. It has been suggested that the USA is seeking 12 years, but would settle for eight.65 There are 
complex issues involved in incentives for, and regulation of, biologics. Big Pharma argues that it is not 
possible to produce biosimilars for these drugs, because of the very different production process. If this is 
the case, then this raises questions about their patentability. Providing a clear description such that a 
skilled person can replicate the invention without undue experimentation is a fundamental condition of 
patent grant. If these products cannot be replicated, then they fail the patentability requirements. To date, 
only 13 biosimilar have been approved for marketing.66 Current regulatory processes require the replication 
of substantial clinical data,67 ensuring that there is a smaller price differential between biologic generics 
and generics for conventional drugs.  
In the USA data exclusivity has turned the drug regulatory authority into a policing agent for patent holders 
– a policy known as patent linkage. The USA is seeking to introduce this controversial policy in the TPPA 
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 Article A.12 in the 2013 version and Article A.11 in the 2014 version.  
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 Article E.12 remains highly contested in the 2014 draft text. Australia agreed to such term extensions in AUSFTA, Article 17.9.8(a). 
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 Despite the fact that President Obama's 2014 budget proposed reducing US data exclusivity for biosimilars to seven years.  
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 Grant Thornton, Bio-dynamism – Insights into the Biosimilars market: An overall perspective, BioAsia 2013, p.19; ASHP 
Advantage e-Newsletter, Preparing for Biosimilars, February 2013, p.2. Hopsira has gained marketing approval in Australia for its 
biosimilar of filgrastim (Harris et al. 2013: 175). 
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 European Medicines Agency Guidelines for assessing biosimilars (http://www.tga.gov.au/pdf/euguide/chmp043704final.pdf).   
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(Article E.17) as it has already done in bilateral trade agreements, starting with the 2001 trade agreement 
with Jordan, and including the AUSFTA. The data linkage provisions in the US-Jordan PTA are estimated to 
have raised pharmaceutical prices by 17 per cent (Abbott et al. 2012).  
3.5  Incentives and penalties  
TRIPS has only eight articles in section 5 on patents. The sole item in regard to penalties is the requirement 
for judicial review of any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent (Article 32).  
In the TPPA the US – focusing as it does on the needs of rights-holders not of consumers or other 
innovating firms – is seeking increased penalties for infringement but no incentives to support high 
standards for patent grant.68 Criminal penalties are to be provided for breaching trade secrecy rules (Article 
H.8.2) and each and every claim in a granted patent should be presumed valid, if there has been patent 
examination (Article H.2.3). In the US the presumption that a granted patent is valid creates a far more 
stringent test for proving patent invalidity than for proving infringement (Jaffe and Lerner 2004). As the US 
Federal Trade Commission noted in its 2002 review of the US patent system, "[a] plethora of presumptions 
and procedures tip the scales in favor of the ultimate issuance of a patent, once an application has been 
filed" (FTC 2003: 8). In Australia a patent application is presumed valid, and it is up to the patent examiner 
to disprove this. This reverse onus of proof is a major factor leading to the issue low quality patents (Moir 
2013b). At present the presumption that a granted patent cannot be assumed to be valid is one of the few 
features of the patent system that does not favour patent owners. The already unbalanced system would 
become far more unbalanced if this proposal were agreed.  
3.6  Transparency and evaluation 
In Section 2.6 several proposals were put forward to introduce transparency, evaluation and audit into 
patent systems, thereby achieving a positive cycle of continuous policy improvement. The first of these 
proposals was a call for data on how patents are used.  
There are no provisions in TRIPS addressing these issues. In the TPPA the US has called for the collection 
and analysis of statistical data – but only in respect of the infringement of patent privileges (Article H.3.2). 
The wording of the current draft of this article is almost identical to the wording in Article 12(2) of the 2011 
leaked version and Article H.3.2 of the 2013 version. Article H.3(2) currently states that “Each Party 
recognizes the importance of collecting and analyzing statistical data and other relevant information 
concerning intellectual property rights infringements as well as the collecting information on best practices 
to prevent and combat infringements". The section in italics is identical to the 2011 version.69 This is very 
one-sided and again points directly to the authorship of this text – although it was presented by a 
government it was clearly drafted by patent-holders and shows none of the balance one expects from 
government text. What we desperately need are proper data on patent use and the costs of this use. 
Infringement is a minor issue in comparison. 
3.7 Miscellaneous other demands 
Beyond these key issues, which affect balance, efficiency and effectiveness in patent systems, the US 
patent ask includes a wide range of other aspects of patent policy. These demands usually involve detailed 
specifications on the relevant issue. They cover such matters as grace periods (self-publication within a 12 
month period does not defeat novelty); how utility (industrial applicability) should be defined and how 
disclosure should operate. The proposed utility/industrial applicability standard is that used in the USA – a 
standard that is lower than that used in the lowest income of the negotiating partners, Vietnam (Public 
Citizen 2011). These detailed proscriptive specifications remind one of heavy-handed old-fashioned 
regulation. They specify processes that should be followed, rather than outcomes that should be achieved. 
As such they stifle innovation and improvement. They tie the hands of all future elected governments, at 
least in respect of these aspects of patent policy. As has been shown elsewhere (Weatherall 2014), such 
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patent inventiveness (Article E.XX.3), both measures that principally benefit those seeking patent privileges.  
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 Except that "collecting" replaces "collection of". 
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over-specification in copyright policy can limit a nation's options when dealing with new technologies and 
other circumstances.  
4. Conclusions 
The proposals put forward in this paper are designed to ensure that patent systems do what they are 
intended to do – encourage technological invention that would not otherwise take place. They are also 
designed to ensure that patent systems provide benefits to users of technology and discourage rent-
seeking behaviours. They are placed on the table to encourage debate and discussion about the 
fundamental principles needed to ensure patent systems operate to achieve their economic goals and meet 
the requirements of TRIPS Article 7 for the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
information and contributing to economic and social welfare.  
Since their earliest days – the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was signed in Paris 
in 1883 – international treaties on patents have been largely drafted with the interests of large business in 
mind. This has been most obvious with TRIPS and the later TRIPS-Plus treaties. These treaties have created 
substantial problems for small and medium sized businesses, for civil society and indeed for sovereign 
governments. Particular concerns have been raised by the health sector.70 
The objective in this paper has been to identify a set of minimum standards which more closely reflect the 
interests of technology-importing economies, many of which are also developing economies. In such 
countries the imbalance of TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus rules are clear. There are few protections against rorting 
the patent system. Where national innovation capacity is low, this simply leads to transfers from 
consumers to foreign companies with no offsetting benefits. Foreign companies are able to acquire 
domestic monopolies without there being any commensurate spillover benefits to domestically-located 
firms. These revenues assist in transfer pricing allowing local subsidiaries of such companies to avoid paying 
a fair share of domestic taxation. Effectively, unless a patent system is redesigned along the lines proposed 
here, compliance with TRIPS means that large global patent-holding companies are able to extract 
substantial rents from the countries to which they send their patented products. There are no spillover 
benefits to offset the static efficiency losses.  
Some one hundred years ago, when today's high income countries were developing, patents were far less 
frequently granted, were limited to genuine technological inventions and required more substantial 
inventiveness. They had a far less deadening effect on local innovation. It is ironic that as the pace of 
innovation has increased, and innovation has become a normal part of commercial life, the standards 
required to obtain a monopoly for such innovation have fallen to such very low levels. Apart from the 
injustice of forcing this neo-mercantilist set of regulatory rules on others, the TRIPS deal also appears to 
have been a Faustian bargain. In exchange for agreeing to these regulatory interventions to reduce 
competition and restrain trade developing nations expected to achieve better market access in textiles and 
agriculture and an end to "punitive measures under the U.S. Trade Act Section 301" (Scherer 2006: 39). The 
former were very slow in coming and the latter has still not occurred.  
In the immediate post-TRIPS environment the EPO has played a large role in assisting economies new to the 
patenting world to establish patent offices. In doing this they have transferred mental models appropriate 
to European economies. Drahos considers that overseas aid in establishing local patent offices has 
integrated them "into a system of international patent administration in which the grant of low-quality 
patents by major patent offices is a daily occurrence" (Drahos 2008: 3). Drahos queries whether this model 
serves the interests of developing economies. But there is no off-the-shelf patent model that does serve 
the interests of developing economies – or even of technology-importing high income economies such as 
Australia, New Zealand or Singapore. This paper is a first step towards this goal.  
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The first-best option would be that restraints on competition and trade not be included in "free trade" 
negotiations – they give free trade a bad name. Unfortunately this preferred option is now precluded by 
the outcome of the Uruguay Round. Post-TRIPS "trade" treaties are further reducing national sovereignty in 
managing domestic policy to support innovation.  
As a second-best approach the set of principles outlined here would achieve the balance required by TRIPS 
Article 7. It would protect most nations from the worst effects of importing the dysfunctional patent 
systems currently in use in jurisdictions such as the USA, Australia and Europe. While the principal need for 
reform is in the critical areas of inventiveness and technology (what is patentable), no reform package will 
succeed unless it also addresses the substantial gaming behaviour encouraged by the current system. If the 
focus on semantics rather than substance is not addressed then other reforms will fail, for the very reasons 
the current system has become so unbalanced. Because patent policy is delivered through courts and 
quasi-courts it may become necessary to introduce additional elements to monitor court compliance with 
parliamentary objectives.  
US demands in recent and current "trade" negotiations are simply designed to allow US patent-holders to 
extract large rents from foreign consumers as well as from US consumers. Unless and until Big Pharma 
places genuine financial data on the table demonstrating that it is unable to earn a commercial return on 
R&D/clinical trial outlays, such proposals simply constitute rent-seeking. This is the real piracy – like that of 
Elizabethan days it is sanctioned by the State. 
The most dangerous part of the USTR TPPA patent proposals is the footnote requiring all signatories to use 
the very low "is it obvious?" approach to assessing inventiveness. This is the doctrine that lies at the heart 
of the current very low inventiveness standard (Moir 2013b). Another particularly dangerous demand is 
proposed article E.1 that requires a rule encouraging evergreening by allowing the use of known things to 
be patented ("any new uses or methods of using a known product"). When a product is patented the 
patent owner is granted a very strong range of exclusionary privileges. To add to these by allowing further 
20-year privileges for each use of the already patented product is double-dipping and a travesty of 
economic policy. It clearly indicates that the USTR agenda is rent-seeking and that there are no boundaries 
to their ambitions in extracting rents. These demands run directly counter to TRIPS Article 7 which requires 
balance between producers and users of technology.  
These post-TRIPS treaties are highly regulatory. The attempt to dot every i and cross every t of current US 
patent administration71 and impose these detailed rules on other parties, at very different levels of 
economic and technological development. Indeed these treaties might better be referred to as "regulatory 
treaties" rather than "trade treaties", as the bulk of the documents are taken up with detailed rules as to 
how various aspects of domestic economic and regulatory policy will work. The newly released Canada-EU 
agreement (CETA) runs to 1,634 pages and has 42 chapters. This seems directed to facilitate the growth of 
lawyers, rather than of business.  
Most of the benefit of a trade treaty arise from domestic reform (Armstrong 2012: 1641). It is the 
dismantling of barriers to competition that delivers the greatest economic benefit – a benefit spread 
throughout the economy, both to consumers and to other firms. The opening up of overseas markets 
benefits only a few firms, but does not create much benefit for the nation as a whole. Trade negotiations 
are too often dominated by lawyers and other non-economists who do not understand this. 
Accepting a range of restrictive interventions to suppress competition in markets for innovation is a very 
high price to pay for small improvements in access to overseas markets. This is especially so as TRIPS 
includes a most favoured nation (MFN) clause which requires additional benefits granted to one party to be 
provided to all other TRIPS signatories. So the cost of these monopoly provisions extends not just to other 
signatories to the preferential agreement, but to all WTO members. The "intellectual property" costs tends 
to be ignored because the lack of policy-useful data means they are hard to quantify. It is clear, however, 
that the costs for pharmaceuticals alone are quite substantial. To prevent essential future economic 
reform, while unquantifiable, is a very substantial cost.  
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